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Ohio's View of the Pollution Exclusion Clause:
Is There Still Ambiguity?
I. THE POLLUTION EXCLUSION CLAUSE-HISTORY
In 1973 the pollution exclusion clause became a standard part of comprehensive
general liability policies.t The clause was included in insurance policies of potential
pollution producers and was intended to deny coverage unless the resulting pollution
damage was "sudden and accidental." 2 A typical pollution exclusion clause provides
that the insurance coverage does not apply to
bodily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of
smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste
materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon the land, the atmosphere
or any water course or body of water, but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge,
dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental. 3
Currently there is a split of opinion on the proper interpretation of the pollution
exclusion clause. 4 Court decisions have depended upon the meaning applied to
"sudden and accidental." A slight majority of courts have found "sudden and
accidental" to be an ambiguous term and have determined their own varying
definitions.5 The remaining courts, on the other hand, focusing more on the intent of
the parties to the insurance contract, have found no ambiguity and have denied
coverage under the policy. 6
One court explained what it believed to be the policy behind the pollution
exclusion clause:
[I]f an insured knows that liability incurred by all manner of negligent or careless spills and
releases is covered by his liability policy, he is tempted to diminish his precautions and relax
his vigilance. Relaxed vigilance is even more likely where the insured knows that the
intentional deposit of toxic material in his dumpsters, so long as it is unexpected, affords him
coverage. In this case, it pays the insured to keep his head in the sand.7
1. Insurance policy language is typically decided by an industry-wide organization rather than by individual
insurance companies. Thus, changes in policy language usually go into effect for all insurance companies at about the
same time. The various time periods given for industry-wide policy provisions are indicated merely for the purpose of
simplicity. In each specific case, the actual language of the particular insurance policy involved must be examined, not
the year of the policy. See Goldberg, Warin, White-Mahaffey & Raby, Insurance Coverage Issues in Hazardous Waste
Cases, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STODY-HAzARous WASTS, SUPERFUND, AND Toxic SUBSTANCES 381, 385-86 (1987).
2. See infra notes 11-38 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of the insurance industry prior to the
"sudden and accidental" requirement.
3. This exact clause or one nearly identical in form was a standard part of all insurance contracts containing a
pollution exclusion clause which are discussed in this Note. See supra note I.
4. Although court decisions continue to adjust any list of various state approaches, an estimated 12 states have
found the clause to be ambiguous (Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey and Washington), nine have found no ambiguity (Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee and Wisconsin), and three have conflicting opinions
(Florida, New York and Ohio). See infra notes 39-40 for a list of the various decisions on each side.
5. See infra notes 41-62 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 63-83 and accompanying text.
7. Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 315 N.C. 688, 697-98, 340 S.E.2d 374, 381
(1986). In 1971, New York required liability insurance carriers to insert a pollution exclusion clause in all policies:
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Ohio has two court opinions which adopt these opposing views. Buckeye Union
Insurance Co. v. Liberty Solvents and Chemical Co. ,8 decided by a county court of
appeals in 1984, found the clause to be ambiguous; it is one of the decisions often
cited by those courts finding coverage. 9 In 1987, however, a federal district court
applying Ohio law expressly declined to follow Buckeye Union and upheld the
validity of the pollution exclusion clause in Borden, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Insurance
Co. 10 The Ohio Supreme Court has yet to consider the question, but in light of this
direct conflict and the inevitability of future litigation involving the clause, the time
has come for the court to settle the issue.
This Note will examine these two Ohio cases in conjunction with the trends in
the law and outline what I believe is the best approach for Ohio and other states to
follow when interpreting the pollution exclusion clause. However, before considering
some of the court opinions in detail, it will be useful to take a brief look at insurance
coverage in similar situations prior to the pollution exclusion clause.
A. Prior to 1966: Was it an "Accident"?
Before 1966 the issue of coverage turned on the question of whether the damage
or injury was caused by accident." Many courts looked to the dictionary for the
definition of accident.12 An accident is "'[a]n event that takes place without one's
foresight or expectation; an undesigned, sudden and unexpected event, chance,
contingency.' "13
Courts had to consider the foreseeability of damage or injury to decide if the result
was accidental. 14 Typically, coverage was denied only if the damage was found to have
been reasonably certain to occur. This usually depended on whether the facts indicated
the pollutants were emitted as a natural consequence of the business of the insured
party. ' 5
In American Casualty Co. v. Minnesota Farm Bureau Services Co. ,t6 the court
could not find an "accident" for the damage to surrounding properties that was
The purpose of the bill is to prohibit commercial or industrial enterprises from buying insurance to protect
themselves against liabilities arising out of their pollution of the environment ....
The bill will help to assure that corporate polluters bear the full burden of their own actions spoiling the
environment, and would preclude any insurance company from undermining public policy by offering this type
of insurance protection.
Technicon Elec. Corp. v. American Home Assur. Co., 141 A.D.2d 124, 141-42, 533 N.Y.S.2d 91, 102 (1988), affd,
74 N.Y.2d 66, 544 N.Y.S.2d 531, 542 N.E.2d 1048 (1989) (quoting 1971 N.Y. LEOls. ANN. at 353-54).
8. 17 Ohio App. 3d 127, 477 N.E.2d 1227 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
9. Id. at 132-33, 477 N.E.2d at 1234.
10. 682 F. Supp. 927 (S.D. Ohio 1987), aff'd, 865 F.2d 1267 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3213 (U.S.
1989). Both Buckeye Union and Borden are discussed in detail infra notes 85-122 and accompanying text.
I1. See supra note 1.
12. See, e.g., American Casualty Co. of Reading, Pa. v. Minnesota Farm Bureau Serv. Co., 270 F.2d 686, 691
(8th Cir. 1959); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Martin Bros. Container & Timber Prods. Corp., 256 F. Supp. 145, 150
(D. Or. 1966).
13. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Briscoe, 205 Okla. 618, 621, 239 P.2d 754, 757 (1951) (quoting
VEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL DIcTIoNARY).
14. See, e.g., Minnesota Farm Bureau, 270 F.2d at 686.
15. Id. at 691.
16. 270 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1959).
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caused by explosives used in manufacturing fertilizer.1 7 The court ruled that the
release of fumes and dust from the plant for more than six years "could not result in
the absence of design, consent and voluntary cooperation of the perpetrator thereof.
Acts which are done with knowledge and which continue over a long period of time
and which continuously cause damage cannot be termed accidents."' 8
However, that did not mean continuing discharges could not be "accidental."
In Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Martin Bros. Container and Timber Products
Corp.,19 a new steam generating plant was installed which caused the emission of
flyash, a residue of the process, from the exhaust stacks. 20 Repeated major changes
made to the system in an attempt to eliminate the problem proved unsuccessful. 21 The
court, however, found an "accident" under the policy because the emission damage
was unexpected, both initially and after each adjustment was made to the system. 22
Insurance companies were unhappy with these court interpretations because the
divergence of opinions made predictability of results difficult. In addition, the insured
parties were not pleased with the requirement of an "accident" for coverage because
they would usually not have insurance protection for damage which occurred over
time.23 The insurance industry attempted to solve both these concerns with a change
in the form of the insurance policy.
B. 1966-73: The "Occurrence" Question
The standard liability policy was revised in 1966 to base coverage on the
happening of an "occurrence." 24 An "occurrence" was typically defined in the
policy as an accident, including injurious exposure to conditions, which resulted in
bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint
of the insured party. 25
As expected, courts often defined an "occurrence" more broadly than an
"accident" and found coverage for injuries resulting from long-term exposure to
pollutants. 26 In Ohio, this approach was clearly established by GrandRiver Lime Co.
v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co.27 Grand River Lime was sued for allegedly polluting
property surrounding its manufacturing plant. Grand River Lime sought a declaratory
judgment that its insurance company, Ohio Casualty, had a duty to defend. 28
Grand River Lime argued successfully that the definition of "occurrence" 29 was
17. Id. at 690.
18. Id. at 691 (citation omitted).
19. 256 F. Supp. 145 (D. Or. 1966).
20. Id. at 147.
21. Id. at 149-50.
22. Id.; see also Moffat v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 238 F. Supp. 165 (M.D. Pa. 1964).
23. See the discussion in Broadwell Realty Serv., Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y., 218 N.J. Super. 516,
532-33, 528 A.2d 76, 84 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987).
24. See supra note 1.
25. For an example of this policy language, see Grand River Lime Co. v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 32 Ohio App.
2d 178, 181, 289 N.E.2d 360, 363 (1972).
26. See id.; City of Carter Lake v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 604 F.2d 1052 (8th Cir. 1979).
27. 32 Ohio App. 2d 178, 289 N.E.2d 360 (1972).
28. Id. at 180, 289 N.E.2d at 361-62.
29. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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broader than that of "accident,''30 and that as a result, the insurer's duty to defend
was similarly broadened. 3' In addition, the plaintiff contended that "the purpose of
the broader language [was] to make clear that coverage under the policy is for 'injury
or damage' and not the 'event or act' producing such injury or damage. "32
The insurance company, on the other hand, argued that the change in the policy
from the use of "accident" to "occurrence" to determine coverage "was intended
to clarify the coverage provided by liability policies, and to avoid the confusion
resulting from courts attempting to distinguish between accidental means and
accidental results.' 33 Therefore, if the damage was either expected or intended by the
insured party, there would be no coverage under the policy. In Grand River Lime,
Ohio Casualty argued that a business which emitted pollutants for seven years would
have expected damage to surrounding properties. 34 The court disagreed. 35
Finding for the plaintiff, the court said "that while the activity which produced
the alleged damage may be fully intended, and the residual results fully known, the
damage itself may be completely unexpected and unintended." ' 36 The court added
that Ohio Casualty issued the policy to Grand River Lime with full knowledge of the
nature of that company's operations, and if the insurance company intended to
exclude any portion of Grand River Lime's operations from coverage, it could have
done so within the contract. 37 Interpretations such as this prompted the adoption of
the pollution exclusion clause by insurance companies in 1973. 3 1
It. DIFFERING VIEWS OF "SUDDEN AND ACCIDENTAL"
Courts have taken different views of the pollution exclusion clause. Slightly
more than half have held the clause to be ambiguous and therefore have interpreted
"sudden and accidental" in a way that provided insurance coverage. 39 The remaining
30. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
31. Grand River Lime, 32 Ohio App. 2d at 184, 289 N.E.2d at 364.
32. Id. at 183, 289 N.E.2d at 364.
33. Id. at 183-84, 289 N.E.2d at 364.
34. Id. at 184, 289 N.E.2d at 365.
35. Id. at 185, 289 N.E.2d at 365.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. For a brief discussion of the history of liability insurance prior to the pollution exclusion clause, see Goulka,
The Pollution Exclusion, FOR Tim DEFENSE, Sept. 1983, at 22, 23-25; see also Broadwell Realty Serv., Inc. v. Fidelity
& Casualty Co. of N.Y., 218 N.J. Super. 516, 533, 528 A.2d 76, 84-85 (1987).
39. See New Castle County v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 673 F. Supp. 1359 (D. Del. 1987) ("sudden"
considered an ambiguous term); Pepper's Steel & Alloys, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 668 F. Supp. 1541
(S.D. Fla. 1987) (release of chemicals neither expected nor intended by insured was "sudden and accidental"); Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 685 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (focused on whether the discharge of pollutants
was unexpected and unintended); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 653 F. Supp. 152 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (question
of fact whether damage from hazardous waste facility was "sudden and accidental," but court found clause to be
ambiguous); City of Northglenn v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 634 F. Supp. 217 (D. Colo. 1986) (after finding clause to be
ambiguous, court focused on the intent of the parties because Colorado law did not strictly construe ambiguities against
the insurer); Independent Petrochem. Corp. v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 654 F. Supp. 1334 (D. D.C. 1986) (followed
line of cases equating "sudden and accidental" with "neither expected nor intended"); Payne v. United States Fidelity
& Guar. Co., 625 F. Supp. 1189 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (followed reasoning of Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents
& Chem. Co., 17 Ohio App. 3d 127,477 N.E.2d 1227 (1984), in finding coverage); Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur.
Co., 259 Ga. 333, 380 S.E.2d 686 (1989) (after the federal district court found no ambiguity in the pollution exclusion
clause, Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 676 F. Supp. 1571 (S.D. Ga. 1987), question certified 865 F.2d 1217
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courts have upheld the exclusion, refusing to find any ambiguity and looking instead
at the intent of the parties to the insurance contract. 40 The following sections will
consider some of the current interpretations of the pollution exclusion clause.
A. Favoring Coverage-'"Sudden and Accidental" Ambiguity
Although many approaches have been taken by courts nationwide, three New
Jersey cases are typical of the trend. In Lansco, Inc. v. Department of Environmental
(11 th Cir. 1989) ("The gradual leaching of hazardous wastes into the ground water and soil ... cannot honestly be
characterized as sudden." Id. at 1573.), the Georgia Supreme Court, in answer to the question certified to it by the
Eleventh Circuit, found ambiguity and construed the policy against the insurer); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.
Armstrong, 479 So. 2d 1164 (Ala. 1985) (following Moulton, Allen & Williams, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
347 So. 2d 95 (Ala. 1977), which found clause to be ambiguous when applied to non-active polluters, the Armstrong court
found pollution exclusion clause to be ambiguous); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dingwell, 414 A.2d 220 (Me. 1980)
(pollution exclusion focused on release of pollutants, not damage); Shapiro v. Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 19 Mass. App.
648, 477 N.E.2d 146 (1985) (court equated meaning of "accident" with "sudden and accidental"); Jonesville Prods.,
Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Group, 156 Mich. App. 508, 402 N.W.2d 46 (1986) (reversing lower court, the appellate court
held that continuous discharge of waste could be "sudden and accidental"); Summit Assoc., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 229 N.J. Super. 56, 550 A.2d 1235 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (followed earlier state cases; see infra
notes 41-61 and accompanying text); Broadwell Realty Serv., Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y., 218 N.J. Super.
516, 528 A.2d 76 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (see infra notes 53-61 and accompanying text); Jackson Township
Mun. Util. Auth. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 186 N.J. Super. 156, 451 A.2d 990 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1982) (see infra notes 46-52 and accompanying text); Autotronic Sys., Inc. v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 89 A.D.2d 401,
456 N.Y.S.2d 504 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (court held pollution exclusion did not apply because plaintiff not involved in
the commercial activity which caused pollution); Niagara County v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 80 A.D.2d 415, 439 N.Y.S.2d
538 (1981) (pollution exclusion applied to active polluters, but not to county); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co., 73
A.D.2d 486, 426 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1980) (leak could be "sudden and accidental" even if not detected for a substantial
period of time); United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Van's Vestlake Union, Inc., 34 Wash. App. 708, 664 P.2d 1262 (1983) (pollution
exclusion is restatement of "occurrence" and applies only to "active polluters"). Cf. Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co. v.
Vasmuth, 432 N.W.2d 495 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (court found "sudden" to be ambiguous under the facts when
considering damage from formaldehyde release following installation of foam insulation).
40. See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Star Fire Coals, Inc., 856 F.2d 31 (6th Cir. 1988) (applying
Kentucky law; see infra notes 66-75 and accompanying text); Becker Elec. Mfg. Corp. v. Granite State Ins., 1989 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6559 (N.D.N.Y.) (continuous disposal of waste solvents for 20 years could not be "sudden and accidental");
New York v. Amro Realty Corp., 697 F. Supp. 99 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (release of chemicals for more than 20 years could
not be "sudden and accidental"); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Korman Corp., 693 F. Supp. 253 (E.D. Pa. 1988)
(continuous illegal dumping for nearly 30 years not "sudden"); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg.
Co., 693 F. Supp. 617 (M.D. Tenn. 1988), aff'd, 875 F.2d 868 (6th Cir. 1989) (insurer met burden of proving pollution
exclusion clause not ambiguous); Hayes v. Maryland Casualty Co., 688 F. Supp. 1513 (N.D. Fla. 1988) (purposeful
deposit of waste material over a period of time neither sudden nor accidental); Centennial Ins. Co. v. Lumbermens Mut.
Casualty Co., 677 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (continuous activity of dumping toxic waste cannot be viewed as
"'sudden"); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. General Host Corp., 667 F. Supp. 1423 (D. Kan. 1987) ("[S]udden" could
not be "consistent with an event which happened gradually or over an extended time, nor could it be consistent with an
event which was anticipated or predictable." Id. at 1428.); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Neville Chem. Co., 650 F.
Supp. 929 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (contamination of water by chemicals neither sudden nor accidental because company had
received complaint from state several years earlier); Fischer & Porter Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 656 F. Supp. 132
(E.D. Pa. 1986) (contamination from continuous dumping of toxic chemicals into drains not "sudden"); International
Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 168 Ill. App. 3d 361, 522 N.E.2d 758, appeal denied, 125111. Dec.
218, 530 N.E.2d 246 (1988) (declining to follow earlier decision, and citing Borden, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 682
F. Supp. 927 (S.D. Ohio 1987); see infra notes 112-22 and accompanying text. "[W]e decline to ignore these
temporal-focused definitions or hold that because the word might also have other contextual uses, it is ambiguous and thus
must be interpreted to provide coverage where the policy language read as a whole clearly intends to exclude such
coverage." 168 Ill. App. 3d at 378, 522 N.E.2d at 769.); Barmet of Indiana, Inc. v. Security Ins. Group, 425 N.E.2d
201 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (in the earliest decision denying coverage, the insured was found to be aware of regular
emissions from malfunctioning pollution control system); Powers Chemeo, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 144 A.D.2d 445, 533
N.Y.S.2d 1010 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988), appeal granted, 74 N.Y.2d 602, 541 N.Y.S.2d 985 (1989) (pollution exclusion
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Protection,41 pollution damage resulted from an oil spill caused by vandals opening
the valves on two oil storage tanks. 42 Because the policy did not contain definitions
of "sudden" or "accidental" the court looked to the commonly understood
definitions of the terms. 43 The court held that although the damage may have resulted
from the intentional acts of third parties, the spill was neither expected nor intended
from the point of view of the insured party. 44 Therefore, the damage was "sudden
and accidental," and coverage was provided. 45
In light of the acts of the vandals in Lansco, the decision by the court can be
defended strongly. Much more troublesome was the New Jersey court's subsequent
decision in Jackson Township Municipal Utilities Authority v. Hartford Accident and
Indemnity Co. 46 A municipal utility deposited liquid waste in town landfills over a
long period of time. The waste seeped into the water supply and caused injury and
property damage. 47
In its opinion, the court equated the prior interpretation of an "occurrence" with
that of "sudden and accidental." 48 Therefore, the exclusion did not apply, and
coverage was provided, if the damage or injury caused was not intended, even though
the release of pollutants, or in this case the burying of pollutants, was intended: "It
is a reaffirmation of the principle that coverage will not be provided for intended
results of intentional acts but will be provided for the unintended results of an
intentional act.' '49
This opinion had the effect of finding coverage in all but those instances
involving "active polluters," e.g., commercial chemical manufacturers and large
industries, that have been put on notice that certain actions can result in damages. 50
Jackson Township considered the issue of the "suddenness" of the pollution damage
still applied when discharge of hazardous materials was performed by former property owner without knowledge or
consent of the insured); Technicon Elec. Corp. v. American Home Assur. Co., 141 A.D.2d 124,533 N.Y.S.2d 91 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1988), afTd, 74 N.Y.2d 66, 544 N.Y.S.2d 531, 542 N.E.2d 1048 (1989) (following Borden, 682 F. Supp.
927; see infra notes 112-22 and accompanying text); Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 315 N.C.
688, 340 S.E.2d 374 (1986) (see infra notes 76-82 and accompanying text); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Sunnes, 77 Or.
App. 136, 711 P.2d 212 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (unintentional nature of damage had "nothing to do with whether the
discharge was 'sudden and accidental .... "' Id. at 140, 711 P.2d at 214.); Wagner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 145
Wis. 2d 609, 427 N.W.2d 854 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (pollution exclusion not ambiguous, but court applied broad
definition of "sudden" to leak discovered several years later); State v. Mauthe, 142 Wis. 2d 620, 419 N.W.2d 279 (Vis.
Ct. App. 1987) (relying on City of Milwaukee v. Allied Smelting Corp., 117 Wis. 2d 377, 344 N.W.2d 523 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1983), long-term pollution damage not "sudden and accidental").
41. 138 N.J. Super. 275, 350 A.2d 520 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975), aff d, 145 N.J. Super. 433, 368 A.2d
363 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976), cert. denied, 73 N.J. 57, 372 A.2d 322 (1977).
42. Id. at 278, 350 A.2d at 521.
43. Id. at 282, 350 A.2d at 524.
44. Id.
45. Id. However, the court did not consider the question of Lansco's duty to attempt to prevent the vandalism.
46. 186 N.J. Super. 156, 451 A.2d 990 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982).
47. Id. at 159, 451 A.2d at 991.
48. Id. at 164, 451 A.2d at 994.
49. Id. at 164, 451 A.2d at 994 (quoting Lyons v. Hartford Ins. Group, 125 N.J. Super. 239, 310 A.2d 485 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973), cert. denied 64 N.J. 322, 315 A.2d 411 (1974)).
50. Jackson Township 186 N.J. Super. at 164, 451 A.2d at 994. Several courts have considered whether the entity
seeking coverage is an "active polluter." See, e.g., Moulton, Allen & Williams, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
347 So. 2d 95 (Ala. 1977); Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co. v. Wasmuth, 432 N.W.2d 495 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); Niagara
County v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 80 A.D.2d 415, 439 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1981); United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Van's Westlake
Union, Inc., 34 Wash. App. 708, 664 P.2d 1262 (1983).
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but said that "sudden" was not limited to an instantaneous happening. 51 "Thus,
regardless of the initial intent or lack thereof as it related to causation, or the period
of time involved, if the resulting damage could be viewed as unintended by the
factfinder, the total situation could be found to constitute an accident .... "52
Finally, in Broadwell Realty Services, Inc. v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New
York,5 3 a New Jersey court again examined the pollution exclusion clause and found
coverage. 54 Gasoline leaked from underground tanks on the insured's property and
onto adjacent lands, causing damage. 55 As expected, Fidelity denied coverage
because of the pollution exclusion clause. 56
The court first explained that its role was to interpret the language of the contract
and not to decide the best public policy approach. 57 The court then disagreed with the
argument that the term "sudden" in "sudden and accidental" had a temporal
meaning. The court followed prior state decisions in holding that "sudden" was
consistent with the common everyday meanings of the term such as "unexpected,"
"unforeseen," or "fortuitous."- 58 Because "accidental" was also defined in terms of
an unexpected event, this interpretation served to treat "sudden and accidental" as a
single element. The court stated: "[T]he pollution exclusion focuses upon the
intention, expectation and foresight of the insured." '59
The court favored the nontemporal definition because it avoided "the question
whether the focus of the exclusion [was] upon the release of the contaminant or the
resulting permeation and damage to the environment. '"60 Also, according to the
court, its interpretation better advanced the reasonable expectations of the insured
party.61
The important element of the cases finding coverage is the interpretation that the
pollution exclusion clause was "ambiguous." Because courts have traditionally
resolved ambiguities in favor of the insured,62 this determination has tended to result
in coverage being upheld.
51. Jackson Twp. Mun. Util. Auth. v. Hartford Acctdent & Indem. Co., 186 N.J. Super. 156, 165,451 A.2d 990,
995 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982).
52. Id. at 165, 451 A.2d at 995 (quoting Allstate Ins. v. Klock Oil Co., 73 A.D.2d 486, 488-89, 426 N.Y.S.2d
603, 605 (1980) (also holding that injury was accidental if there was no intent to cause harm)).
53. 218 N.J. Super. 516, 528 A.2d 76 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 519, 528 A.2d at 77.
56. Id. at 521-22, 528 A.2d at 79.
57. Id. at 523, 528 A.2d at 80.
58. Id. at 530-31, 528 A.2d at 83.
59. Id. at 535, 528 A.2d at 85.
60. Id., 528 A.2d at 86.
61. Id. at 536, 528 A.2d at 86.
62. See, e.g., Vachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 276 N.C. 348, 172 S.E.2d 518 (1970);
Mazzilli v. Accident & Casualty Ins. Co. of Winterthur, 35 N.J. 1, 170 A.2d 800 (1961); Bobier v. National Casualty
Co., 143 Ohio St. 215, 54 N.E.2d 798 (1944). Cf. City of Northglenn v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 634 F. Supp. 217 (D.
Colo. 1986) (court found language of pollution exclusion clause to be ambiguous, but looked to the intent of the parties
under Colorado law rather than construing against the insurer).
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B. Upholding Exclusion-Intent and Plain Meaning
Other courts have denied insurance coverage by focusing on the intent of the
parties and the courts' perception of the plain meaning of the pollution exclusion
language. Recently one court, refusing to find any ambiguity in the pollution
exclusion clause, stated: "The language is clear and plain, something only a lawyer's
ingenuity could make ambiguous." 63 That court, unlike those in New Jersey, refused
to define "sudden" as something occurring over a long period of time.64 The court
also found that to be covered under the pollution exclusion clause, the occurrence had
to be both "sudden" and "accidental," and not just one of the two. 65 This approach
appears to be gaining approval, as an examination of several recent decisions
indicates.
In United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Star Fire Coals, Inc. ,66 Star Fire
Coals was sued by a neighbor of its coal plant who claimed personal injury and
property damage as a result of the plant's emission of coal dust over many years. 67
Star Fire Coals was aware of the emission problem and had taken various
unsuccessful steps to control the discharge. 68 The insurer denied coverage, citing the
pollution exclusion clause. 69 Star Fire Coals argued that it was entitled to coverage
under the policy because use of the term "accident" in both the definition of
"occurrence" and in the pollution exclusion clause created a "circle of ambi-
guity. "70
The court prefaced its opinion with the legal principle that under Kentucky law,
ambiguous language in an insurance policy would be construed in favor of the
insured, but added that it would not use "tortured logic to find ambiguity where in
fact none exists.' '71 In reversing the decision of the district court, the court held that
the occurrence requirement and the pollution exclusion clause were not interchange-
able: "We believe the 'occurrence' definition results in a policy that provides
coverage for continuous or repeated exposure to conditions causing damages in all
cases except those involving pollution, where coverage is limited to those situations
where the discharge was 'sudden and accidental.' "72
63. American Motorists Ins. v. General Host Corp., 667 F. Supp. 1423, 1429 (D. Kan. 1987).
64. Id. at 1428. After a thorough review of the case law, one writer believes the courts have "gone astray" by
ignoring the "sudden" requirement. Note, The Pollution Exclusion Clause Through the Looking Glass, 74 GEo. L.J.
1237, 1296 (1986). The focus of the insurance policy in these cases is on three parameters-activeness, directness and
suddenness:
Activeness corresponds roughly to intent or degree of fault. Directness corresponds roughly to the concept of
proximate cause. The suddenness parameter measures the time that elapses between the beginning and the end
of the pollution sequence in question. The degrees of activeness, directness and suddenness in any given
situation will describe a pollution event. The event that the three parameters fix will fall within or without the
area of coverage as defined by the insurance policy.
Id. at 1281-82 (citations omitted).
65. American Motorists, 667 F. Supp. at 1429.
66. 856 F.2d 31 (6th Cir. 1988).
67. Id. at 32.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 34.
71. Id. at 33.
72. Id. at 34.
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The court also held that the definition of "sudden" included a temporal element
which combined "the immediate and the unexpected. It must also be emphasized that
the focus of this 'sudden and accidental' exception to the general pollution exclusion
clause is on the nature of the discharge of the pollution itself, not on the nature of the
damages caused." 73
Additionally, the court said that the "sudden and accidental" requirement was
not synonymous with "unexpected and unintended," and that the term "should not
be defined by reference to whether the accident or damages were expected." 74 "The
ultimate question," the court said, "is whether the discharges of coal dust were
sudden and accidental; they clearly were not." 'Ts
A similar result was reached by the Supreme Court of North Carolina in Waste
Management of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Insurance Co.76 Waste Management
sought a finding of coverage after being sued by the United States for allegedly
dumping waste materials into a landfill for a number of years, leading to contami-
nation of the groundwater underneath the landfill. 77
Like the court in Star Fire Coals, the court said it would not create an ambiguity
where it did not believe one existed:
No ambiguity ... exists unless, in the opinion of the court, the language of the policy is
fairly and reasonably susceptible to either of the constructions for which the parties contend.
If it is not, the court must enforce the contract as the parties have made it and may not, under
the guise of interpreting an ambiguous provision, remake the contract and impose liability
upon the company which it did not assume and for which the policy holder did not pay. 78
The court said determining if events are "accidental" and constitute an
"occurrence" is dependent upon whether the events were expected or intended from
the insured party's viewpoint. 79 However, the court believed "the exclusion clause is
concerned less with the accidental nature of the occurrence than with the nature of the
damage." 80
Disagreeing with the Lansco court, the Waste Management court also held that
"sudden" should not be held synonymous with "accidental" because to do so would
make the exclusion requirements redundant.8 ' Therefore, the definition of "sudden"
included a temporal element that required the polluting event to have happened
"instantaneously or precipitantly.' '82
Reviewing these recent decisions, one court said that a clear pattern has emerged
from consideration of the pollution exclusion clause:
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 35.
76. 315 N.C. 688, 340 S.E.2d 374 (1986).
77. Id. at 689, 340 S.E.2d at 376.
78. \vachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Westchester Fire Ins., 276 N.C. 348, 354, 172 S.E.2d 518, 522 (1970) (quoted
in Waste Management, 315 N.C. at 694, 340 S.E.2d at 379).
79. Waste Management, 315 N.C. at 696, 340 S.E.2d at 379.
80. Id. at 696-97, 340 S.E.2d at 380-81.
81. Id. at 698-99, 340 S.E.2d at 381-82.
82. Id. at 699, 340 S.E.2d at 382.
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Without exception, the cases which construe the pollution exclusion clause to preclude
coverage involve (1) deliberate disposition of potentially hazardous waste or produced
substances, (2) widespread pollution, (3) multiple claimants, (4) damaging actions over an
extended period of time, usually in the regular course of business, and (5) discovery of the
damage years after polluting conduct. 83
Courts interpreting the pollution exclusion clause consistent with the courts in
Star Fire Coals and Waste Management represent the current trend, but many states,
like New Jersey, still find the clause to be ambiguous. 84 Each of these approaches is
currently represented in Ohio and it will be up to the Ohio Supreme Court to resolve
this inconsistency. The next section will examine these two Ohio cases in detail.
C. The Ohio View
Current Ohio law interpreting the pollution exclusion clause is unsettled. In
1984, the Court of Appeals for Summit County in Buckeye Union Insurance Co. v.
Liberty Solvents and Chemical Co. 85 found the pollution exclusion clause to be
ambiguous and ruled for the insured party.86 However, in 1987, a federal district
court applied Ohio law in Borden, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Insurance Co.;87 the court
determined that the clause was not ambiguous and ruled for the insurer. 88 The
following examination of the two cases will demonstrate the irreconcilability of the
approaches and the necessity for a settlement of the conflict.
1. Buckeye Union Insurance Co. v.
Liberty Solvents and Chemical Co.89
The facts in Buckeye Union are similar to those in the cases discussed
previously. Liberty Solvents had been named along with thirty-seven other entities in
a complaint which alleged, inter alia, that hazardous waste, of which Liberty
Solvents was a generator, had been released from drums that were improperly
disposed of by Chem-Dyne Corporation, a waste removal company. 90 The hazardous
wastes polluted the surface waters, soil, and groundwater near the disposal site.
Buckeye Union brought a declaratory judgment action to determine if coverage was
provided under the insurance policy.91 The trial court granted summary judgment for
83. Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co. v. Wasmuth, 432 N.W.2d 495, 498 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
84. See supra note 39 for cases finding clause to be ambiguous and note 40 for cases denying coverage because
of the pollution exclusion clause. These conflicting interpretations have caused problems for both the insurance industry
and the environment; the insurance industry suffers due to the difficulty in predicting when coverage must be provided,
while the environment suffers due to the potential for delays in cleanup operations. See Note, supra note 64, at 1278-81.
85. 17 Ohio App. 3d 127, 477 N.E.2d 1227 (1984).
86. Id. at 132-34, 477 N.E.2d at 1234-35.
87. 682 F. Supp. 927 (S.D. Ohio 1987), affd, 865 F.2d 1267 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3213 (U.S.
1989).
88. Id. at 930-31.
89. 17 Ohio App. 3d 127, 477 N.E.2d 1227 (1984).
90. Buckeye Union, 17 Ohio App. 3d at 128, 477 N.E.2d at 1230.
91. Id. at 127-28, 477 N.E.2d at 1229-30.
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Buckeye Union and ruled that the insurance company did not have a duty to defend
or indemnify Liberty Solvents. Liberty Solvents appealed. 92
According to the court, construction of the pollution exclusion clause was a
question of first impression in Ohio. 93 Although the court said it was only considering
the duty of the insurance company to defend and not the question of indemnifica-
tion,94 its opinion had the effect of determining the interpretation that the lower court
should apply to the pollution exclusion clause; this interpretation was likely to be
determinative of the case below. The court determined that the theories of liability of
the complaints of Ohio and the United States against Liberty Solvents fell under the
federal Superfund Act, 95 which was designed to facilitate the cleanup of hazardous
waste sites. 96 The potential liability under the Superfund Act triggered Buckeye
Union's duty to defend unless coverage was excluded by the policy. 97 Buckeye Union
argued that the pollution exclusion clause provided the necessary exclusion to deny
coverage. 98
The court began its analysis by noting that in Ohio "'[a] contract of insurance
prepared and phrased by the insurer is to be construed liberally in favor of the insured
and strictly against the insurer, where the meaning of the language used is doubtful,
uncertain or ambiguous.' 99 The court then followed Grand River Lime' °° and
decided that the meaning of "occurrence" was broader than that of "accident," and
that an "occurrence" may encompass a period of time. 101 Therefore, the complaint
which alleged the release of hazardous wastes by Liberty Solvents stated an
"occurrence" under the policy.102
Next, the court considered the implications of the pollution exclusion clause on
the duty of Buckeye Union. The court said any provisions that served to exclude
coverage were to be strictly construed against the insurer.t0 3 "Where exceptions,
qualifications or exemptions are introduced into an insurance contract, a general
presumption arises to the effect that that which is not clearly excluded from the
operation of such contract is included in the operation thereof.' t 4
92. Id. at 128, 477 N.E.2d at 1230.
93. Id. at 132, 477 N.E.2d at 1234.
94. Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents & Chem. Co., 17 Ohio App. 3d 127, 129, 477 N.E.2d 1227, 1230
(1984).
95. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6911a,
9601-09, 9611-14, 9616-26, 9631-33, 9641, 9651, 9653, 9656-62, 9671-75 (1983 & Supp. 1988) (Superfund Act).
96. Buckeye Union, 17 Ohio App. 3d at 130, 477 N.E.2d at 1232. The Superfund Act created a $1.8 billion fund
to finance cleanup operations following environmental damage. Id. at 129, 477 N.E.2d at 1231. The Act holds polluters
strictly liable for the cost of cleanup. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1983 & Supp. 1988). Following suit under the Superfund Act,
polluters usually turn to their insurers for indemnification as Liberty Solvents did here. Buckeye Union, 17 Ohio App. 3d
at 129-30, 477 N.E.2d at 1231-32.
97. Id. at 130, 477 N.E.2d at 1232.
98. Id.
99. Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents & Chem. Co., 17 Ohio App. 3d 127, 131, 477 N.E.2d 1227, 1232
(1984) (quoting Munchick v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 2 Ohio St. 2d 303, 209 N.E.2d 167, 168 (1965) (citation omitted)).
100. See supra notes 27-37 and accompanying text.
101. Buckeye Union, 17 Ohio App. 3d at 131-32, 477 N.E.2d at 1232-33.
102. Id. at 132, 477 N.E.2d at 1233.
103. Id., citing Munchick, 2 Ohio St. 2d 303, 305, 209 N.E.2d 167.
104. Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents & Chem. Co., 17 Ohio App. 3d 127, 132, 477 N.E.2d 1227, 1234
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The court then noted that "sudden and accidental" were not defined in the
contract and that alone could be a sufficient ground for finding ambiguity within the
pollution exclusion clause.10 5 The court cited with approval the interpretations of
the New Jersey Superior Court in Lansco0 6 and Jackson Township 0 7 in finding the
pollution exclusion clause to be ambiguous. 108 This interpretation viewed the pollu-
tion exclusion clause as merely a restatement of the "occurrence" definition and did
not consider the definition of "sudden" to include a temporal element.109
Applying this approach to the facts of the case, the court said:
There are no allegations in the complaint that compel the conclusion that Liberty Solvents
intended or expected the releases of hazardous waste substances by Chem-Dyne or the
damages that such releases would cause. Construing the words "sudden and accidental"
most favorably to the insured and in accordance with the interpretation afforded to the
polluters exclusion clause by other jurisdictions, we conclude that the release and resultant
property damages could be found to be "sudden and accidental" from the standpoint of
Liberty Solvents.1 0
The decision was not reviewed by the Supreme Court of Ohio. Nevertheless, the
opinion of the court in Buckeye Union has been cited with approval on several
occasions by courts of other states."II Until 1987 this approach appeared to be the law
in Ohio, but the decision in Borden puts the current state of the law in doubt.
2. Borden, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Insurance Co.112
Borden, Inc. sought defense and indemnification from its insurer after Amoco
Oil Company filed a complaint against Borden alleging that Borden had fraudulently
concealed the existence of hazardous wastes on land sold to Amoco. 13 Affiliated
Insurance argued that the pollution exclusion clause precluded coverage, but Borden,
relying on Buckeye Union, contended the release of pollutants fell within the "sudden
and accidental" definition.114
The court first determined that Ohio law applied to the case.' 15 After considering
Buckeye Union and the cases it relied upon, the court said it was "not persuaded" by
(1984) (quoting syllabus of Home Indem. Co. v. Plymouth, 146 Ohio St. 96, 64 N.E.2d 248 (1945)) (emphasis added
by Buckeye Union court).
105. Buckeye Union, 17 Ohio App. 3d at 132, 477 N.E.2d at 1234.
106. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
108. Buckeye Union, 17 Ohio App. 3d at 132-34, 477 N.E.2d at 1234-35.
109. Id. at 134, 477 N.E.2d at 1235.
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., Pepper's Steel & Alloys, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 668 F. Supp. 1541, 1548 (S.D.
Fla. 1987); Broadwell Realty Serv., Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y., 218 N.J. Super. 516, 531, 528 A.2d 76,
84 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987).
112. 682 F. Supp. 927 (S.D. Ohio 1987), affld, 865 F.2d 1267 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3213 (U.S.
1989).
113. Id. at 928.
114. Id. at 929.
115. Id. Borden, Inc. had its principal place of business in Ohio, while Affiliated Insuranpe was located in Rhode
Island. The court determined that under Ohio conflict of laws rules, Ohio had a more significant relationship with the
insurance contract because the contract was negotiated and entered into in Ohio, and the policy was to be applicable in
all states including Ohio.
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the approaches taken by these courts.116 The court said that although deference was
given to Buckeye Union, that decision was not binding upon the court: "This Court
is convinced that the Ohio Supreme Court would not adopt the construction of the
pollution exclusion set forth in Buckeye." t1 7 The court noted that Ohio law required
insurance policies to be enforced in accordance with their terms and that policy
provisions which were clear and unambiguous could not be enlarged to achieve some
other objective of the court." 8
In granting the summary judgment motion of Affiliated Insurance, the court held
that the pollution exclusion clause was not ambiguous:
The "sudden and accidental" exception expressly applies to the "discharge, dispersal,
release or escape" of the pollutants, rather than to the harm caused by the pollutants.
"Sudden," in its common usage, means "happening without previous notice or with very
brief notice," while "accidental" means "occurring sometimes with unfortunate results by
chance alone." . . . The meaning of these terms is clear and should not be twisted simply
to provide insurance coverage when the courts deem it desirable." 9
The court said that Borden regularly deposited hazardous wastes on the property
purchased by Amoco for several years. t20 "Clearly, this is not an allegation of a
'sudden and accidental' event. Rather, it is precisely the type of activity which the
pollution exclusion was drafted to preclude. The Court must give effect to the intent
of both parties. '"121 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
decision. 122
The clear rejection of Buckeye Union by the Borden court has created a conflict
in the law that cannot be settled without the guidance of the Ohio Supreme Court. The
following sections of this Note will consider the efforts of the insurance industry to
avoid similar problems in the future and a suggestion for courts interpreting the
pollution exclusion clause.
HI. THE VIEW TO THE FUTURE
Every year more cases will be considered that turn on the interpretation of a
pollution exclusion clause. Each time damages are alleged from long-term exposure
to pollutants, insurance policies in effect over many years are implicated. 123 Courts
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id., relying on Rhoades v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 54 Ohio St. 2d 45, 374 N.E.2d 643 (1978).
119. Borden, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 682 F. Supp. 927, 930 (S.D. Ohio 1987), aff d, 865 F.2d 1267 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3213 (U.S. 1989) (quoting WVEBsTR's THinD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1986)).
120. The company deposited phosphogypsum, a radioactive component from production of phosphoric acid, on the
property from 1964-70. The pile of the substance was 35 feet high and covered 30-40 acres. Id. at 930.
121. Id. (citation omitted).
122. Borden, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 865 F.2d 1267 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3213 (U.S.
1989).
123. An issue beyond the scope of this Note is the question of which insurance policies are triggered. Since damage
often occurs over a long period of time, there are usually several policies, possibly with different contract terms,
implicated by the pollution event. Courts have developed three basic approaches to this problem: 1) the exposure theory
implicates the policies in effect when the injured person was exposed to the injury-causing substance, e.g., Insurance Co.
of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1217, 1226 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1109 (1981) (unfair to hold present insurer liable for injuries caused before that company chose to provide coverage); 2)
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will have plenty of opportunities to rule on the coverage issue and decide whether to
look at the intent of the parties or assign the risk of loss to the insurance companies.
In response, insurance companies have attempted again to limit their liability.
A. Modern Version of the Pollution Exclusion Clause
The current version of the pollution exclusion clause has deleted the term
"sudden and accidental." For example, one policy now excludes coverage of claims
relating
(I) [T]o bodily injury or property damage arising out of the actual, or alleged or threatened,
discharge, dispersal, release or escape of pollutants:
(a) at or from premises owned, rented or occupied by the name insured;
(b) at or from any site or location used by or for the named insured or others for the
handling, storage, disposal, processing or treatment of waste.124
The courts have yet to determine the scope of this new exclusion clause.
However, this new clause will not eliminate interpretations of the pollution
exclusion clause. Each claim for coverage will implicate the policies in effect during
the time contamination occurred. 125 Because long-term exposure is often involved, it
is likely that courts will face interpretations of the pollution exclusion clause into the
distant future. In addition, the courts' opinions of the validity of the exclusion will
likely influence any subsequent determinations of the validity of new attempts to
deny coverage to polluters.
B. Suggested Approach for Ohio
After examination of the opinions of Buckeye Union, and Borden, and the many
other cases on each side of the argument, it is clear that the Borden decision denying
coverage is more defensible and should be adopted by all Ohio courts. In addition,
the approach in Borden reflects the current trend of the law:
A review of the most recent cases reveals that there is an emerging nationwide judicial
consensus that the "pollution exclusion" clause is unambiguous and that an insured who is
accused of causing injury or property damage by the intentional discharge of pollutants over
an extended period of time is bound by the terms of the exclusion and is not entitled to be
defended or indemnified by its insurer.126
In spite of the many detailed discussions by courts facing the question of the
validity of the pollution exclusion clause, the single important issue is whether the
the manifestation theory implicates the policies in effect when the injury became known to the injured person, e.g.,
Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 682 F.2d 12, 16, 23 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1028 (1983)
(court also may have considered that defendant had no insurance coverage at the time of exposure); and 3) the triple trigger
theory implicates all policies during the period of exposure, exposure in residence, and when the injury manifests itself,
e.g., Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 667 F.2d 1034, 1042, 1045-46 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1007 (1982) (court seems to have decided that this approach is better at spreading the risk among insurers). For
a more detailed discussion, see Bauer & Lakind, Toward Resolution of Insurance Coverage Questions in Toxic Tort
Litigation, 38 Rrrosis L. REv. 677, 708-15 (1986).
124. N.Y.L.J., March 16, 1988, at l, col. 1.
125. See supra note 123.
126. Technicon Elec. Corp. v. American Home Assur. Co., 141 A.D.2d 124, 131, 533 N.Y.S.2d 91, 96 (1988),
affd, 74 N.Y.2d 66, 544 N.Y.S.2d 531, 542 N.E.2d 1048 (1989).
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pollution exclusion clause is ambiguous. A finding of ambiguity allows the court to
discount the "sudden and accidental" coverage requirement and require indemnifi-
cation by the insurer, while a ruling that no ambiguity exists in the clause virtually
assures no liability for the insurer.
The courts that have found coverage have done so by equating "sudden and
accidental" with the "occurrence" requirement in the policy. This results in inter-
pretation of the policies without regard to the "sudden" requirement. Because most
of the cases litigated have involved damages occurring after long-term exposure to
pollutants, the courts' definitions of "sudden" are often determinative.
Although most courts have attempted to define "sudden" with a dictionary
meaning, no definition can be complete without considering the term within its
context. The pollution exclusion clause requires that damage be both "sudden" and
"accidental" for coverage to be provided. Courts that interpret "sudden" without a
temporal meaning are creating a redundancy in the policy with "sudden and
accidental" being the same as an "occurrence." Because it is illogical to argue that
the pollution exclusion clause, with its "sudden and accidental" requirement, was
added to all policies without some intention on the part of the insurance companies,
then any interpretation of the clause should result in a change from the previous
"occurrence-only" requirement. This can be accomplished only by assigning a
temporal element to "sudden."
It is possible that some insured parties may be unaware of the existence and
meaning of the pollution exclusion clause; the court therefore has a duty to try to
determine the intent of the contracting parties. If it is found that the insured party was
unaware of the clause and in an unequal bargaining position, then the court can find
the clause to be unconscionable. This recognizes that those parties in the best
bargaining position should be bound by all the terms of the policies purchased.
A party that generates pollution is or should be aware of the purpose of the
pollution exclusion clause. It is only when facing a damage action that the waste
producer claims an ambiguity. The waste producer has not paid for coverage for
pollution damage unless the polluting event was "sudden and accidental;" to decide
that the polluting event need not be both sudden and accidental is to provide coverage
to which the alleged polluter is not entitled.
Finally, as the North Carolina Supreme Court pointed out in Waste Man-
agement,t27 there is a strong public policy reason for finding against the waste
producer. Allowing insurance coverage creates a "moral hazard" 1 28 that may
discourage the waste producer from taking adequate precautions to avoid damage to
the environment. This problem, of course, exists with all insurance coverage, but
127. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
128. Black's Law Dictionary defines "moral hazard" as:
[Tihe risk or danger of the destruction of the insured property .... as measured by the character and interest
of the insured owner, his habits as a prudent and careful man or the reverse, his known integrity or his bad
reputation, and the amount of loss he would suffer by the destruction of the property or the gain he would make
by . . .collecting the insurance.
BLAcK's LAW DICMO NARY 647 (5th ed. 1979).
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pollution insurance appears to be distinguishable, for example, from auto insurance
and malpractice insurance.
With auto insurance and malpractice insurance, the covered party has a personal
stake in avoiding claims. Auto accidents and malpractice claims involve trips to
court, increased premiums, and the stigma associated with being known as an
"unsafe driver" or a "careless" doctor or lawyer. In addition, a severe violator may
lose his or her license or be barred from professional practice. Because the individuals
who control the conduct of potential polluters are removed from the stigma associated
with pollution and do not face the same personal risks, it would seem that potential
polluters are much less likely to consider safety a priority.
Denying coverage for pollution damage that is not sudden and accidental will
best encourage sufficient precautions to avoid damage, because the polluter knows
that it will be held responsible. Cleanup costs will simply represent another cost of
doing business, with the more responsible entities passing on their lower costs to the
consumer and the worst polluters forced to clean up or risk being uncompetitive. In
the long run this approach will best serve the environment.
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts in Ohio should adopt the view in Borden and focus on the intent of the
contracting parties, rather than doing whatever is necessary to find coverage. Samuel
Williston believed the inquiry into intent was a "cardinal principle" of contract law:
"In the case of contracts, the avowed purpose and primary function of the court is the
ascertainment of the intention of the parties." 1 29 Although insurance companies may
be somewhat better able to spread the risk, the waste producer is not entitled to
coverage it neither paid for nor expected. Courts create a fiction when they argue that
the term "sudden and accidental" is ambiguous. Courts finding coverage could be
honest and find the clause void as violating public policy, but they would not be able
to explain this result without severe criticism. Therefore, courts creatively interpret
policy to gain the desired result. Most companies that produce and use potential
pollutants knew the meaning of the pollution exclusion clause when the insurance
contract was purchased and those companies should not now be able to avoid
financial responsibility by shouting "ambiguity."
Robert E. Henke
129. 4 S. WLUSoN, VILUSTON ON CoNTRAcTs § 601, at 303-04 (1961) (citation omitted).
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